The nuclear threat understandably raises a frightening prospect. The hope is that rationality would prevail, and that senior political and military leaders in Moscow, who may not be so obsessed with Ukraine, would come down on the side of caution. Would he miscalculate again? That is the key unknowable. And he has made many miscalculations, beginning with his disastrous decision to invade Ukraine. Putin seems a rational actor, though he also seems more emotional today than in the past, which may cloud his calculation of risks and costs. The Ukrainian army will not march on Moscow.Ī rational actor in this case would conclude that the risks and costs of using a nuclear weapon are simply too high. Russia can lose this war-that is, the Ukrainian military could drive the Russians out-and the Russian state will survive. It makes little sense for the Kremlin to run that risk in a conflict that is not existential. Having opened Pandora’s box, the Kremlin would confront the unpredictable and catastrophic consequences that nuclear escalation could bring to Russia. Russia could find itself in a shooting war with NATO, when the bulk of its ground forces can barely cope with Ukraine. They would have to ask themselves: would caving in to Russian nuclear use in Ukraine not invite further nuclear threats and attacks from Russia and elsewhere in the future? Western leaders have compelling reasons to support Ukraine and have publicly staked out their position in support of Kyiv. That might-might-prove a winning bet, but it more likely would prove a loser. It would hope that public fear in the West would restrain the Western reaction. This is the gamble the Kremlin would face. Consequences could also include military action by NATO members, such as conventional air and missile strikes on Russian forces in Ukraine. While officials have avoided specifics, the consequences could include an upsurge in the flow of arms to Ukraine, likely with an end to restrictions barring their use against targets in Russia proper. Western leaders have made clear their response would carry “extraordinarily serious” consequences for Russia. The Kremlin also has to weigh how the West would react. Moscow would face broad international condemnation, Putin would become a global pariah, and other states could join in applying sanctions against Russia. Russia would probably lose India, most likely China, and the rest of the Global South, who thus far have sought to remain neutral. ![]() The Kremlin would have to consider international reactions. They would almost certainly fight on after a nuclear attack. ![]() Russian escalations-such as indiscriminate missile strikes on cities-have only hardened the Ukrainians’ will to resist. The Ukrainians understand what Russian victory means: summary executions, mass arrests, torture chambers, filtration camps, and loss of independence. Moreover, the shock of the first nuclear attack in more than 75 years likely would not secure the capitulation Moscow wants. The Ukrainian army does not mass forces in a way that would create an inviting target for a nuclear attack. However, the Russians would have to calculate what the situation might look like after a nuclear detonation.Ī nuclear strike would achieve relatively little on the battlefield. Such decisions would allow the Kremlin to snatch some kind of victory from what increasingly looks like a debacle. The goals would be two-fold: get Kyiv to capitulate, and persuade the West to end its military assistance to Ukraine. ![]() Russia’s declining military fortunes have raised the question of whether Putin and the Kremlin might use a nuclear weapon against Ukraine.
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